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Abstract
Sen’s theorem, which highlights the conflict between the Pareto condition and individual rights, is
a fundamental result in the area of social choice. In this paper, we give an analog of Sen’s theorem
for consensus functions on hierarchies by showing that in almost all cases it is not possible to find a
ternary Pareto consensus function where two distinct algorithms will have the same decisive impact on
the consensus output.
c© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In 1970, Amartya Sen proved that there does not exist a Paretian social welfare function that
can accommodate individual rights in a meaningful way [8]. Sen considered the situation where
k ≥ 2 individuals rank n ≥ 3 alternatives such that the resulting rankings are linear orders
on the set of alternatives. In this context, a social welfare function takes as input k individual
rankings and outputs a single social ranking of the alternatives. (Sen’s result only depends on
the social outcome being an acyclic relation.) In this discussion we will assume that the domain
of a social welfare function is unrestricted. The Pareto condition states that society ranks a over
b if every individual ranks a over b. Sen modeled individual rights by introducing an axiom
called minimal liberalism. This axiom says that there exist two individuals i and j and two pairs
of alternatives {a, b} and {x, y} such that society’s ranking of {a, b} agrees with i ′s ranking of
{a, b} and society’s ranking of {x, y} agrees with j ′s ranking of {x, y}. So i and j have the right
to decide for society how to rank {a, b} and {x, y}, respectively. Sen’s theorem, restricted to
social welfare functions, states that there does not exist a social welfare function that satisfies the
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Pareto condition and the axiom of minimal liberalism. Developments of Sen’s theorem in social
choice theory can be found in Jerry Kelly’s book [4].
The conflict between individual rights and the Pareto condition for social welfare functions
translates in a natural way to consensus functions on hierarchies. Informally, a hierarchy (on a set
S) is a type of classification scheme for the data set S and is often the application of a clustering
algorithm to S. In this context, an individual is identified with a particular clustering algorithm
and a consensus function takes as input a k-tuple of hierarchies and outputs a single consensus
hierarchy. For more information about various types of consensus functions on hierarchies and
consensus functions on other types of discrete structures see [3].
It is known that a hierarchy on S can be thought of as a special type of ternary relation on
S [2] (see also [5]). Using the ternary approach, the Pareto condition for social welfare functions
translates to a ternary Pareto condition for consensus functions on hierarchies. Individual rights
for consensus functions are based on a notion of decisiveness for ordered triples. We will
require that there exist two distinct individuals (algorithms) and two ordered triples such that one
individual is decisive on the first triple while the second individual is decisive on the other ordered
triple. The idea is that two individuals will have the same decisive impact on the consensus
output. We show that, unless the two triples overlap in a particular way, there is a conflict between
individual decisiveness and the ternary Pareto condition. The definitions of ternary Pareto and
decisiveness used in this paper were defined and used in a previous paper [1] in order to obtain a
version of Arrow’s theorem for consensus functions on hierarchies.
In the next section we establish the notation and terminology related to the study of
hierarchies. The final section contains our analog of Sen’s theorem.
2. Terminology and notation
Let S be a set with n ≥ 5 elements. A hierarchy on S is a collection H of nonempty subsets
of S such that S ∈ H , {x} ∈ H for all x ∈ S, and A ∩ B ∈ {A, B,∅} for all A, B ∈ H . The
set of all hierarchies on S is denoted by H. A set X in a hierarchy H for which 1 < |X | < n is
called a nontrivial cluster of H . The notation H∅ will be used to denote the hierarchy with no
nontrivial clusters. For any nontrivial subset X of S let HX = H∅ ∪{X}. So HX is a hierarchy on
S where X is the only nontrivial cluster. Similarly, the notation HX,Y and HX,Y,Z will be used to
represent hierarchies where X , Y and X , Y , Z are the only nontrivial clusters, respectively.
For each hierarchy H there is an associated ternary relation rH on S where (a, b, c) ∈ rH
if and only if there exists X ∈ H such that a, b ∈ X and c 6∈ X . This relation formalizes the
notion that a and b are more similar to each other than either element is to c with respect to the
hierarchy H . Thus, we will often write ab |H c instead of (a, b, c) ∈ rH . In general, an ordered
triple (a, b, c) of distinct elements from S is called a triad. The function that maps a hierarchy H
on S to the ternary relation rH is injective [5]. In fact, a subset X of S belongs to H if and only if
(a, b, c) ∈ rH for all a, b ∈ X and c 6∈ X . By identifying H with rH , we see that a hierarchy is
just a collection of triads. The following five properties of rH are easy to prove and will be useful
in the sequel. If a, b, c, d are four distinct elements from S, then
ab |H c ⇒ ba |H c (1)
ab |H c ⇒ ac |H b fails (2)
ab |H c and ac |H d ⇒ ab |H d (3)
ab |H c and ad |H b ⇒ ad |H c (4)
ab |H c and ad |H c ⇒ bd |H c. (5)
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A consensus function is a map C : Hk → H where k ≥ 2. Elements of Hk , the
k-fold Cartesian product, are called profiles and the conventional notation for profiles is P =
(H1, . . . , Hk), P ′ = (H ′1, . . . , H ′k), and so on. The hierarchy C(P) will be referred to as the
consensus output. If K = {1, . . . , k} and I ⊆ K , we say that I is decisive for (a, b, c) if for any
profile P , ab |C(P) c whenever ab |Hi c for all i ∈ I . If K is decisive for all possible triads, then
we say that C is a ternary Pareto consensus function. The ternary Pareto condition reflects true
consensus; if each input hierarchy contains the triad (a, b, c), then the consensus output should
also contain (a, b, c).
A more controversial idea is the requirement that one or more individuals should have a direct
impact on some portion of the consensus result. If C(P) = H1 for all P = (H1, . . . , Hk),
then C is a ternary Pareto consensus function where {1} is decisive for all possible triads. In
this example, {1} has too much control. To avoid this situation we want to find a ternary Pareto
consensus function where at least two individuals (algorithms) will have the same impact on the
consensus result. Toward this end, we will require that there exist i 6= j in K and triads (a, b, c)
and (x, y, z) such that {i} is decisive for (a, b, c) and { j} is decisive for (x, y, z). We will see that
in almost all cases it is not possible to maintain such a balance and still require that the consensus
function satisfies the ternary Pareto condition.
3. The main result
We are now ready to state and prove our analog of Sen’s theorem for the consensus function
on hierarchies.
Theorem 1. There exists a ternary Pareto consensus function C : Hk → H with {i} decisive for
(a, b, c), { j} decisive for (x, y, z), and i 6= j if and only if {a, b} = {x, y}.
Proof. Assume that there exists a ternary Pareto consensus function C : Hk → H with {i}
decisive for (a, b, c), { j} decisive for (x, y, z), i 6= j and {a, b} 6= {x, y}. The triads (a, b, c)
and (x, y, z) each contain three distinct elements but the sets {a, b, c} and {x, y, z} may overlap.
If {a, b, c} = {x, y, z}, then consider the profile P = (H1, . . . , Hk) where Hi = H{a,b} and
Hr = H{x,y} for all r 6= i in K . In particular, H j = H{x,y}. Notice that ab |C(P) c and xy |C(P) z
by the decisiveness of {i} and { j}, respectively. So C(P) contains clusters A and B such that
a, b ∈ A, c 6∈ A, x, y ∈ B, and z 6∈ B. Since {a, b, c} = {x, y, z} and {a, b} 6= {x, y} it follows
that A ∩ B 6∈ {A, B,∅} contrary to C(P) being a hierarchy.
Now consider the case where |{a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z}| = 2. If {a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z} = {a, b}, then,
since {a, b} 6= {x, y} and (u, v, w) ∈ rH if and only (v, u, w) ∈ rH for any triad (u, v, w) and
hierarchy H , we may assume y = a and z = b. Let P = (H1, . . . , Hk) be the profile where
Hi = H{a,b},{c,x} and Hr = H{x,a,c} for all r 6= i in K . Then ab |C(P) c and ax |C(P) b by the
decisiveness of {i} and { j}. Also, xc |C(P) b by ternary Pareto. By Eqs. (4) and (5), ab |C(P) c
and xa |C(P) b implies that xb |C(P) c. Thus xb |C(P) c and xc |C(P) b contrary to Eq. (2).
At this stage we know that {a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z} 6= {a, b}. A symmetric argument shows that
{a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z} 6= {x, y}. Given Eq. (1) we may assume that b 6∈ {x, y, z} and y 6∈ {a, b, c}.
This leads to two possibilities: a = x and c = z or a = z and c = x . If a = x and c = z, then
define P = (H1, . . . , Hk) by Hi = H{a,b},{c,y} and Hr = H{x,y,c},{y,c} for all r 6= i . If a = z
and c = x , then define P = (H1, . . . , Hk) by Hi = H{a,b,y} and Hr = H{x,y,b},{y,b} for all r 6= i
in K . For both possibilities decisiveness gives ab |C(P) c and xy |C(P) z. Notice that xy |C(P) z
is either ay |C(P) c or cy |C(P) a. By Eq. (5), ay |C(P) c and ab |C(P) c implies that by |C(P) c.
But for the first profile, cy |C(P) b contrary to by |C(P) c. For the second profile, yc |C(P) a
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and yb |C(P) c by ternary Pareto. By Eq. (4), yc |C(P) a and yb |C(P) c implies that cb |C(P) a
contrary to ab |C(P) c.
For the remainder of the proof we will invoke the five conditions given in Section 2 when
needed without explicit references.
Now consider the case where |{a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z}| = 1. Given Eq. (1) and symmetry we
only need to consider three possibilities: a = x or a = z or c = z. If a = x , then
define P = (H1, . . . , Hk) by Hi = H{a,b},{c,y,z} and Hr = H{a,y},{a,c,y,z} for all r 6= i
in K . Decisiveness of {i} and { j} implies that ab |C(P) c and ay |C(P) z. By ternary Pareto,
yz |C(P) b and cy |C(P) b. Observe that ab |C(P) c and ay |C(P) z implies that by |C(P) z or
by |C(P) c contrary to yz |C(P) b and cy |C(P) b. If a = z, then define P = (H1, . . . , Hk)
by Hi = H{y,a,b},{y,a},{c,x} and Hr = H{a,x,y,c},{x,y,c} for all r 6= i in K . Decisiveness gives
ab |C(P) c and xy |C(P) a. By ternary Pareto, xc |C(P) b and ay |C(P) b. Now xy |C(P) a and
ay |C(P) b implies that xy |C(P) b. Next, xy |C(P) b along with xc |C(P) b implies that yc |C(P) b.
Notice that yc |C(P) b and ay |C(P) b implies that ac |C(P) b contrary to ab |C(P) c. Finally, if
c = z, then define P = (H1, . . . , Hk) by Hi = H{a,b,x},{c,y} and Hr = H{x,y,a},{x,y,a,c} for all
r 6= i in K . As usual, decisiveness yields ab |C(P) c and xy |C(P) c. By ternary Pareto, ax |C(P) c.
Now ax |C(P) c and xy |C(P) c implies that ay |C(P) c. Next, ay |C(P) c and ab |C(P) c implies
that by |C(P) c. Another application of ternary Pareto gives cy |C(P) b contrary to by |C(P) c.
The final case is {a, b, c} ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅. Define P = (H1, . . . , Hk) by Hi = H{a,b,x},{c,y,z}
and Hr = H{x,y,a},{x,y,a,c,z} for all r 6= i in K . Decisiveness yields ab |C(P) c and xy |C(P) z.
By ternary Pareto, yz |C(P) b, xa |C(P) z, and cy |C(P) b. Now xy |C(P) z and xa |C(P) z implies
that ay |C(P) z. Next, ay |C(P) z and yz |C(P) b implies that ay |C(P) b. Observe that ay |C(P) b
and cy |C(P) b implies that ac |C(P) b contrary to ab |C(P) c.
For the converse assume that {a, b} = {x, y}. If c = z, then define C : Hk → H by
C(P) =
{
Hi if ab |Hi c,
H j otherwise
for all profiles P = (H1, . . . , Hk). In this case, C is ternary Pareto and {i} and { j} are decisive
for (a, b, c). We now consider the case c 6= z. For any profile P = (H1, . . . , Hk), let
〈a, b〉 j = ∩{X ∈ H j : {a, b} ⊆ X}
and
Hi |〈a,b〉 j = {A ∩ 〈a, b〉 j : A ∈ Hi and A ∩ 〈a, b〉 j 6= ∅} ∪ H∅
and define C : Hk → H by
C(P) =
{
Hi if ab |H j z fails,
Hi |〈a,b〉 j ∪ {X ∈ H j : X 6⊂ 〈a, b〉 j } otherwise.
It can be checked that C is a ternary Pareto consensus function, {i} is decisive for (a, b, c), and
{ j} is decisive for (a, b, z). 
In this paper, we gave an analog of Sen’s theorem for consensus functions on hierarchies by
showing that in almost all cases it is not possible to find a ternary Pareto consensus function
where two distinct algorithms will have the same decisive impact on the consensus output. It
would be interesting to find out whether there are ways in which the negative conclusion of
Theorem 1 can be avoided. As a first step, one could consult Don Saari’s papers [6,7] where he
gives a surprisingly elementary explanation of Sen’s problem and where he offers some possible
resolutions.
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